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Статья посвящена созданию математического управления процессами вложения средств банка в его деятельность. Весь процесс построения оптимального управления можно разбить на две составляющие: первая, выявление функций, описывающих движение ликвидного капитала в банке, и вторая, использование полученных функций в схеме динамического программирования. Прежде эта задача была рассмотрена в статье «Оптимальное управление вложением средств банка как фактор экономической стабильности» в № 4 за 2012 год. В существующей статье рассмотрена модификация этого решения, в частности, вводится дополнительная функция реинвестирования ℜ(φ), где φ — это приток ликвидных средств от предшествующего шага.

Article is devoted to the creation of a mathematical control of the bank investment process. The whole process of building optimal control may be divided into two components: in the first place, there is the identification of the functions describing the liquid capital movement in the bank and, in the second place, the use of these functions in the scheme of dynamic programming. Before this problem was discussed in the article "Optimal control of the bank investment as a factor of economic stability" in the 4^th issue for 2012. In the present article considers this modification of the solution, in particular, we use ℜ(φ) as a function of reinvestment, where φ is inflow of liquid capital realized at the previous step of control.

Modeling banking systems using a network approach has received growing attention in recent years. One of the notable models is that developed by Iori et al, who proposed a banking system model for analyzing systemic risks in interbank networks. The model is built based on the simple dynamics of several bank balance sheet variables such as deposit, equity, loan, liquid asset, and interbank lending (or borrowing) in the form of difference equations. Each bank faces random shocks in deposits and loans. The balance sheet is updated at the beginning or end of each period. In the model, banks are grouped into either potential lenders or borrowers. The potential borrowers are those that have lack of liquidity and the potential lenders are those which have excess liquids after dividend payment and channeling new investment. The borrowers and the lenders are connected through the interbank market. Those borrowers have some percentage of linkage to random potential lenders for borrowing funds to maintain their safety net of the liquidity. If the demand for borrowing funds can meet the supply of excess liquids, then the borrower bank survives. If not, they are deemed to be in default and will be removed from the banking system. However, in their paper, most part of the interbank borrowing-lending mechanism is described qualitatively rather than by detailed mathematical or computational analysis. Therefore, in this paper, we enhance the mathematical parts of borrowing-lending in the interbank market and present an algorithm for simulating the model. We also perform some simulations to analyze the effects of the model’s parameters on banking stability using the number of surviving banks as the measure. We apply this technique to analyze the effects of a macroprudential policy called loan-to-deposit ratio based reserve requirement for banking stability.

Modeling banking systems using a network approach has received growing attention in recent years. One of the notable models is that developed by Iori et al, who proposed a banking system model for analyzing systemic risks in interbank networks. The model is built based on the simple dynamics of several bank balance sheet variables such as deposit, equity, loan, liquid asset, and interbank lending (or borrowing) in the form of difference equations. Each bank faces random shocks in deposits and loans. The balance sheet is updated at the beginning or end of each period. In the model, banks are grouped into either potential lenders or borrowers. The potential borrowers are those that have lack of liquidity and the potential lenders are those which have excess liquids after dividend payment and channeling new investment. The borrowers and the lenders are connected through the interbank market. Those borrowers have some percentage of linkage to random potential lenders for borrowing funds to maintain their safety net of the liquidity. If the demand for borrowing funds can meet the supply of excess liquids, then the borrower bank survives. If not, they are deemed to be in default and will be removed from the banking system. However, in their paper, most part of the interbank borrowing-lending mechanism is described qualitatively rather than by detailed mathematical or computational analysis. Therefore, in this paper, we enhance the mathematical parts of borrowing-lending in the interbank market and present an algorithm for simulating the model. We also perform some simulations to analyze the effects of the model’s parameters on banking stability using the number of surviving banks as the measure. We apply this technique to analyze the effects of a macroprudential policy called loan-to-deposit ratio based reserve requirement for banking stability.

Deposit benchmark interest rates are a policy implemented by banking regulators to calculate the interest rates offered to depositors, maintaining equitable and competitive rates within the financial industry. It functions as a benchmark for determining the pricing of different banking products, expenses, and financial choices. The benchmark rate will have a direct impact on the amount of money deposited, which in turn will determine the amount of money available for lending.We are motivated to analyze the influence of deposit benchmark interest rates on the dynamics of banking loans. This study examines the issue using a difference equation of banking loans. In this process, the decision on the loan amount in the next period is influenced by both the present loan volume and the information on its marginal profit. An analysis is made of the loan equilibrium point and its stability. We also analyze the bifurcations that arise in the model. To ensure a stable banking loan, it is necessary to set the benchmark rate higher than the flip value and lower than the transcritical bifurcation values. The confirmation of this result is supported by the bifurcation diagram and its associated Lyapunov exponent. Insufficient deposit benchmark interest rates might lead to chaotic dynamics in banking lending. Additionally, a bifurcation diagram with two parameters is also shown. We do numerical sensitivity analysis by examining contour plots of the stability requirements, which vary with the deposit benchmark interest rate and other parameters. In addition, we examine a nonstandard difference approach for the previous model, assess its stability, and make a comparison with the standard model. The outcome of our study can provide valuable insights to the banking regulator in making informed decisions regarding deposit benchmark interest rates, taking into account several other banking factors.

Deposit benchmark interest rates are a policy implemented by banking regulators to calculate the interest rates offered to depositors, maintaining equitable and competitive rates within the financial industry. It functions as a benchmark for determining the pricing of different banking products, expenses, and financial choices. The benchmark rate will have a direct impact on the amount of money deposited, which in turn will determine the amount of money available for lending.We are motivated to analyze the influence of deposit benchmark interest rates on the dynamics of banking loans. This study examines the issue using a difference equation of banking loans. In this process, the decision on the loan amount in the next period is influenced by both the present loan volume and the information on its marginal profit. An analysis is made of the loan equilibrium point and its stability. We also analyze the bifurcations that arise in the model. To ensure a stable banking loan, it is necessary to set the benchmark rate higher than the flip value and lower than the transcritical bifurcation values. The confirmation of this result is supported by the bifurcation diagram and its associated Lyapunov exponent. Insufficient deposit benchmark interest rates might lead to chaotic dynamics in banking lending. Additionally, a bifurcation diagram with two parameters is also shown. We do numerical sensitivity analysis by examining contour plots of the stability requirements, which vary with the deposit benchmark interest rate and other parameters. In addition, we examine a nonstandard difference approach for the previous model, assess its stability, and make a comparison with the standard model. The outcome of our study can provide valuable insights to the banking regulator in making informed decisions regarding deposit benchmark interest rates, taking into account several other banking factors.

В работе представлена модель пополнения банковской ликвидности собственными средствами банков. Дано методологическое обоснование необходимости создания банковских стабилизационных фондов для покрытия убытков в период кризиса в экономике. Приводится эконометрический вывод уравнений описывающих поведение банка в финансовой и операционной деятельности. В соответствии с поставленной целью создания стабилизационного фонда вводится критерий оптимальности осуществляемого управления. На основе полученных уравнений поведения банка, методом динамического программирования выводится вектор оптимальных управлений.

This paper presents a model of replenishment of bank liquidity by additional income of banks. Given the methodological basis for the necessity for bank stabilization funds to cover losses during the economy crisis. An econometric derivation of the equations describing the behavior of the bank financial and operating activity performed. In accordance with the purpose of creating a stabilization fund introduces an optimality criterion used controls. Based on the equations of the behavior of the bank by the method of dynamic programming is derived a vector of optimal controls.